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A B S T R A C T
China is the only country of the traditional nuclear powers whose nuclear 
arsenal is growing in size and capability. It is diversifying its delivery sys-
tems, modernizing its missiles, and building up its overall warhead arsenal. 
Further, it is engaged in a substantial buildup of conventional missiles. These 
are certainly facilitated by the economic and general military rise of China. 
It is less clear that China's strategic arsenal has in turn supported the gen-
eral rise of China. That is, what benefits has China received given its en-
hancements of its strategic forces? This chapter will begin by charting the 
changes in China's strategic arsenal, and compare that broadly to other re-
gional and global players in this arena. It will then examine the ways in 
which nuclear weapons and strategic forces in general are thought to en-
hance the power of nations and assess the degree to which that has occurred 
for China.
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Introduction
$ This chapter attempts to assess the rise of Chinese power in the area of nuclear and 
strategic weapons. The nuclear realm is not a straightforward competition in which the 
greater number wins, or the side dominant in offensive capabilities wins.  Nuclear weapons 
instead are of questioned utility.  Some argue that nuclear taboos constrain their utility.  
Others note that they play a limited role in cases outside of existential conflicts.  It is cer-
tainly the case that numbers are not the only factor that matters.  These issues will be ex-
plored. Thereafter, the next section will chart the absolute increase in Chinese power as ca-
pabilities in this area.  However since power is relative rather than absolute, the next section 
will consider how this absolute change interacts with the changes in other state's capabilities 
to evaluate some measure of the balance of capabilities. 
$ Finally, the chapter turns to a discussion of the regional effects of these Chinese 
buildups.  Even if observed behavior is a poor measure of the effect of Chinese power, a few 
lessons can be gleaned, particularly from the cases of India, Japan, and Taiwan. The US pre-
sents a special case, as it is heavily involved in alliance relationships and other security part-
nerships in the region.  For the most part, there is little evidence of an increase in Chinese 
influence from its growing nuclear arsenal. 
Assessing “Power” and other Implications
$ Measuring power is one of the most challenging problems in political science.  The 
concept is central to nearly all facets of the field and yet there is nothing approaching a 
!
1 The author would like to thank David Abrahamson and Sarah Watson for valuable research assistance.  The 
chapter represents the author’s views and not those of any governmental department.
shared conception of how it might be measured.  As the introduction chapter notes, one can 
view power as capabilities: this approach, typically taken by realists, focuses on easily opera-
tionalizible measures: military spending, number of tank divisions, etc.2  An alternate view 
focusses on power as influence: Ronald Dahl offers a simple definition: “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that he would not otherwise do.”3 Of course, 
the difficulty of measuring preferences as distinct from observed behavior erodes the practi-
cal utility of this definition. Further, as the introduction chapter notes, power as influence 
might be further disaggregated into the ability to change or to shape behavior:
State A exerts political influence when it either changes the behavior of State B or shapes the op-
tions available to it. .... This might be conceived as shaping the international environment for other 
states and delimiting the options that are available to them.4
In practice, both these approaches are challenging.  On the power as capability side, several 
complications occur. For instance, operationally measurable power as capability in the soft 
power realm is hard to find.5  This is less the case in some aspects of nuclear weapons (deliv-
erable warheads can be counted, megatonnage can be estimated), but more pronounced in 
others (accuracy of delivery systems).  Furthermore, as in other areas, strategic power as ca-
pability is more usefully conceived of as relative in nature.  In the nuclear arena, this is 
rather more complicated that simple bean counting.  Survivability and strategic defenses 
certainly enter into the equation.  
Beyond that, there are important boolean elements to strategic weapons.  Having any weap-
ons brings with it dramatically more power as capability than having none.  Having a secure 
second strike provides dramatically more power as capability than only possessing weapons 
vulnerable to preemption.  Thus, there are several levels or thresholds of nuclear weapons 
capabilities that are central for analysis.  Returning to language similar to the introductory 
chapter, there are a series of punctuated equilibria, or better, discontinuous growth in influ-
ence as capabilities rise, as illustrated in the below chart.
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
! 2
2John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
3R Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science 2 (1957): 201-215.
4 Edelstein and Fravel chapter.
5 Cite recent IS debate on soft power.











Time/Development of Nuclear Programs
C A T E G O R I E S  O F  N U C L E A R  C A P A B I L I T I E S
Thus, it is critical to think about what the various levels or plateaus are. These might be 
thought of as thresholds, above which minor increases in weapons capability do not convey 
major increases in influence.  At some point of development, however, dramatic increases in 
strategic capability do come from the accumulation of minor technical enhancements or 
quantitative increases.  An initial, tentative list might consist of the following levels.
• Existential nuclear capability: the possession of a very small number of warheads.
• Deliverable nuclear capability: the ability to deliver such weapons reliably against an ad-
versary in a time of crisis.
• Rudimentarily secure second strike: some confidence in your ability to respond in the face 
of an adversary’s ability to attempt a splendid first strike.
• Robustly secure second strike: high confidence that a significant retaliatory arsenal would 
survive an adversary’s surprise attack.
• War fighting capability: an ability to conduct ongoing, discriminate retaliation against 
targets chosen in real time, perhaps with damage assessments from previous strikes.
• Preemptive capability: an ability to preempt nuclear attacks by others.
The chart below simply adds a few of those titles to the graph presented earlier.
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Time/Development of Nuclear Programs
}Deliverable weapons
}Rudimentary Second Strike
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}War fighting
Obviously, not all of these plateaus are as discontinuous as the others.  In particular, the line 
drawn between the attainment of a rudimentarily secure second strike and creating a more 
robust version of the same is likely to be gradual and shallow.  Further, no category is com-
pletely developed here (e.g., preemptive capability against a state with a small nuclear arse-
nal differs from that against a superpower’s).
Still, one could lay out the capabilities, or more often the pairs of relative capabilities, that 
would fall into each category.  Each seems to capture different elements of nuclear weapon 
capabilities that ought translate into different levels of nuclear influence.
Thus, the key question for the empirical section of the paper is what threshold of strategic 
capability has China attained (and against what adversary, since this remains a relative char-
acterization) and how has that changed in the recent past or will it change in the near term 
future. 
C A T E G O R I E S  O F  I N F L U E N C E  I N  T H E  S T R A T E G I C  
S P H E R E
All of this discussion is still separate from concluding that a given plateau of strategic capa-
bility leads to certain forms of influence. If we might recognize that obtaining existential 
nuclear capability is distinct from having a deliverable capability, what influence does either 
convey?  
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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Nuclear weapons have been very, very rarely used in terms of an actual detonation on an ad-
versary.  Nevertheless, their influence on international politics after 1945 has been substan-
tial.  
One way to think about influence is Robert Art’s typology of defense, deter, compel, and 
swagger.6  (We might add to this some emphasis on conquest or aggression beyond limited 
instances of compellence, although this usage has not occurred in over sixty years.7)  These 
all fall under the rubric of influence as change in the introduction’s approach.  As this is the 
easier to measure of the two forms of influence discussed, further consideration of it in the 
nuclear realm is warranted.  
Each of Art’s four types of influence (as change) requires an emphasis on each side's percep-
tion of the balance of relative capabilities. What matters in nearly all cases is “do I believe 
my adversary has a given level of nuclear capability.”  Related, the role of willpower is central 
in nuclear affairs.8  Thus, it is critical to identify what each side in a dyad believes about the 
relative balance.
Beyond that, perceptions about the nature of nuclear weapons capabilities themselves vary. 
In some senses, although not all, some variation in the influence of nuclear weapons is ac-
counted for by the constructed nature of our thinking about nuclear weapons. They have 
developed a number of norms surrounding their use and capabilities.9  While arguable advo-
cates have overstated the utility of such norms, it goes to far to say such norms are entirely 
non-existent.
Thus, for nuclear weapons more than for most capabilities, power is in the eye of the be-
holder.  This underlines the importance of the discussion at the end of the chapter surveying 
the perceptions of potential Chinese rivals and adversaries.  
For “influence as change” to occur (per the discussion in the introduction), there is some 
need for coercive diplomacy to be deployed rather overtly.  This is rare in the nuclear arena, 
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6Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?," International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): 3-35.
7 In this vein, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," In-
ternational Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security 
Dilemma?," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 90-121.
8 On these issues, the classic remains Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1966).
9N Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," Inter-
national Organization 53, no. 03 (2003): 433-468.
and nearly absent in the Chinese context since 1969.10 However, for influence as "shaping", 
the effects are more subtle, methodologically challenging, and empirically elusive.   How-
ever, and this is critical, it is still vital for the "shaped" country to perceived a shift in power 
that requires a constrained set of options, etc. per the intro chapter.  Thus, an emphasis on 
perception remains warranted.  
The problem is, evaluating this sort of power as influence in shaping is nearly impossible.  Dur-
ing the cold war, international security specialists grappled—fairly unsuccessfully in this 
author’s view—with the difficulties of evaluating general deterrence success as distinct from 
immediate deterrence success.11  The latter occurs when a relatively explicit threat deters an 
action that was clearly going to occur without such a threat.  General deterrence refers more 
broadly to the deterrence of a serious challenge in the first place (as such it is related to the 
more coercive side of dissuasion in today’s lexicon). Evaluating whether China’s strategic rise 
has such a general deterrent (or coercive) effect is unlikely to lead to reliable conclusions.  
Instead, we are better off looking for cases of immediate deterrence, or overt compellence.
A D D I T I O N A L  C O M P L I C A T I O N S
Chinese nuclear capabilities have developed at the same time that its conventional, eco-
nomic, and--to some extent--soft power capabilities have also grown.  This complicates an 
assessment of the influence gained from the rise of Chinese strategic capabilities, per se.  
This is particularly the case given that much of potential for influence by China is in the 
shaping rather than changing category. 
One final point on the potential for coercive effects of nuclear weapons: It should be re-
membered from the Cold War that the utility of nuclear blackmail or coercion between the 
superpowers was extremely limited.12 Few potential dyads in China's region are perfectly 
analogous to the cold war case, and that should lead to some caution.
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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10 [describe Xiong and Zhu statements; note the latter was not a crises threat nor was either as authoritative as 
frequent cold war statements; on an alt view of Xiong’s statement, see Win Lord in China Confidential, p. 484.
11James Fearon, "Selection Effects and Deterrence," International Interactions 28, no. 1 (2002): 5-29. Paul K. Huth 
and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?: Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-
526. Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 
(1990): 466-501. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I 
Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989): 208-24.
12 See Welch chapter in Christopher P. Twomey, "Dangers and Prospects in Sino-American Strategic Nuclear 
Relations," in Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Rich-
ard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, We A% Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
ADD MORE HERE
Measuring Chinese Strategic Capabilities
The term “strategic capabilities” is a bit vague.  It certainly includes nuclear capabilities, but 
increasingly today it is important to also consider other capabilities that might have strate-
gic effect.  Chinese anti-satellite weapons certainly fall into this category, but so too do the 
large arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles that might be used to directly attack targets 
of strategic interest in Taiwan (and in a few other areas).  Clearly, this is a slippery slope, and 
many other weapons systems might also have an effect that is arguably “strategic” as op-
posed to operational or tactical in nature.  This chapter will limit the discussion to just nu-
clear capabilities and missile defenses.
L A U N C H  S Y S T E M S
Charting the growth in just these three areas is no trivial task.  In the nuclear arena over the 
past several years, China has made important strides in several areas: warheads, delivery sys-
tems, and penetration capabilities.  
More is known about the developments in Chinese delivery systems than the other areas. 
There has been a rapid buildup of the shorter-range conventional systems.  These systems, 
now increasing at more than a hundred a year, are useful only for local border conflicts and 
Taiwan scenarios.  They increasingly serve as a strategic asset in the latter, give their rapid 
growth as seen in the below chart.  







2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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Until very recently, China had depended on liquid fueled missiles for its primary delivery 
systems.  Traditionally, regional targets were covered by DF-3A and -4 systems developed in 
the 1970s or earlier.  This were silo based, liquid fueled missiles that required substantial 
time before launch.  These missiles were produced in the low dozens, and would have been 
aimed at Russia (primarily) but also U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Philippines, as well as In-
dia and Japan, themselves.  The United States proper was only targeted by the much smaller 
number of DF-5As. Initially, something like 4-6 were estimated, by the 1990s the inventory 
was more typically estimated as 18-24.14
Table 1: Chinese Missile Systems15




DF-31A (CSS-9) 11,200km 2008? <10
DF-5A (CSS-4) 13,000km 1983 20
DF-31 7,200km 2007 <10
DF-4 (CSS-3) 5,400km 1980 15-20
DF-3A (CSS-2) 3,000km 1971 15-20
DF-21 (CSS-5) 1,750km 1986 60-80
DF-15 (CSS-6 M-9) 600km 1995 315-355
DF-11  (CSS-7 M-11) 300km 1995 675-715
Beginning in the 1980s, solid fueled systems were developed for target sets in Russia, Japan, 
Taiwan, and India (the DF-21).  But only in the past few years (if then) have solid fueled sys-
tems that could reach the United States become operational.  Previously the only system 
that could reach the continental United States was the liquid fueled DF-5A, which was only 
deployed in very small numbers.  The map below highlights the range of these various mis-
sile systems.  
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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14 Again see NRDC.  See also the appropriate entry at www.globalsecurity.com
15 Data from table primarily taken from the Pentagon’s annual report, with the IOC data coming from 
www.globalsecurity.com.
Figure 5: Chinese Missile Ranges16
The double-digit systems (DF-11, 15, 21, and 31) are all solid fueled and are launched from 
mobile launchers.  These greatly complicate preemptive strikes, a point that will be returned 
to later.  
As apparent from the above discussion, the pace of modernization has typically been quite 
slow.  Arsenal sizes of any of the missile categories remain very small by historic standards, 
exception for the DF-11 and -15 systems.  (Most, perhaps nearly all, of these are convention-
ally armed, for use in a Taiwan scenario.)  The development of the longer ranged systems had 
been plagued with difficulty: the US Defense Intelligence Agency had repeatedly expected 
the DF-31 class to enter into service a few years hence.  After a decade or more of being 
wrong on that score, its unclassified data now suggest that a few such missiles are in opera-
tional service.  
The Chinese submarine force capable of launching ballistic missiles armed with nuclear 
weapons exhibits a similar pattern.  A single Xia-class SSBN entered the fleet in the 1980s, 
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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16 Chart taken verbatim from Office of the Secretary of Defense, " (Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 
May 5, 2008).
but is widely believed to not have ever gone out on patrol.  Rumors of a second boat having 
sunk and of radiation leaks in the Xia emphasize the frailty of this component of China’s 
nuclear force.  More recently, again some progress is apparent.  Civilian satellite imagery ap-
pears to show 3 different boats of a new class, the Type-94 Shang-class.  The Office of Naval 
Intelligence hypothesizes that an eventual fleet of five boats is possible.17  These may some-
day field a variant of the DF-31 missile that is just entering service, the JL-2.  According to 
some sources, the submarine launched version of the missile has struggled in tests.18  Beyond 
that, the Chinese submarine force not had extensive experience patrolling.19
Thus, looking back over the past 40 years, the pattern is of slow technological development 
and modest inventories in the nuclear weapons delivery systems.  
A C C U R A C Y ,  C O U N T E R M E A S U R E S ,  A N D  T R A I N I N G
While there is enough publicly available data about delivery systems to engage in the above 
discussion, much less is known about Chinese nuclear warheads and reentry systems. Con-
sistent with a strategy that emphasizes counter-value targeting,20 China is thought to have 
relatively large yield warheads.21  According to the Cox Commission, China obtained some 
information about the advanced W-88 warhead through espionage.  Whether due to this 
intelligence coup or her own indigenous efforts, China is now thought to have made some 
advanced toward miniaturization that allow for multiple warheads to be delivered by a single 
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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17 ONA, 2007?
18 Gertz, 2005; also see columns on April 30, 2009 and June 12, 2008.  For more bombastic Chinese reports, see 
Open Source Center, article # CPP20070521710015.
19 On low patrol rates, see Hans Kristensen. 
20Senior C. Y. Yao, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence," in Perspectives on Sino-
American Strategic Nuclear Issues, ed. Christopher P Twomey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
21 See NRDC reports
reentry vehicle.22  It is likely, based on American and Soviet experiences, that such warheads 
would be smaller in yield.
Recently in both Chinese statements and in official 
Pentagon assessments, there has also been discussion 
of enhanced capabilities for penetrating American (or 
other) missile defense systems.  Various “penetration 
aids” discussed include decoys, chaff, and maneuvering 
warheads.23  While not a “penetration aid”, the de-
ployment of multiple warheads on each ballistic mis-
sile would raise the costs to the defender substantially, 
at a more modest increase in cost to the attacker; 
thus, this capability too has implication for penetra-
tion.  
Related, there is much attention in Chinese writings 
to enhancing the accuracy of Chinese delivery sys-
tems.  While most of the attention in this regard goes 
to the shorter-range conventional systems (for which 
improved accuracy has obvious implications), the 
longer-ranged systems have undoubtedly benefited as 
well.24
Another recent focus of emphasis by the Second Artillery has been on retaliating while un-
der a joint attack of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons.  This has manifested in numerous 
Chinese press reports of the Second Artillery’s training exercises and is often referred to as 
fighting in a “complex electromagnetic environment.”25  This refers to a concerted effort to 
deal with adversaries attacking with advanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, 
coupled with munitions (presumably precision guided): “signal simulation, electromagnetic 
jamming, accurate strike, and reconnaissance and monitoring”26 (There is also an odd focus 
on defending Second Artillery units from attack by special forces teams, that seems to reso-
Figure 6: Mating warhead with a DF-3 
Missile; Source: www.fas.org
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
! 11
22M Chase, A Erickson and C Yeaw, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Im-
plications for the United States," Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1 (2009): 67-114.
23 Christopher P. Twomey and Kali Shelor, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, 3rd Annual Meeting, Conference 
Report,"  (2008).
24Ibid.
25 Open Source Center, article # CPP20090226710002; CPP20091207702002, CPP20090927001015
26 Open Source Center, article # CPP20091207702002
nate with historic Chinese approaches to warfare.27)  Some of this emphasis has focused on 
traditional approaches to camouflage and concealment.28  Continued emphasis on under-
ground bunkers is apparent throughout.29
Training has become less scripted,30 with the creation of a dedicated opposing force within 
the Second Artillery.  The asymmetric nature of this “blue force” is noted explicitly; the 
training is not geared towards assessing third or fourth nuclear exchanges, but rather an en-
vironment when the Second Artillery’s communications are jammed, its locations surveilled, 
and its positions attacked by precision guided munitions.31  Throughout, all the training ap-
pears consistent with responding only after attacked.32
Note that both of the Chinese’ newest systems, the DF-31A and JL-2 on board the SSBNs, 
will challenge a Chinese command and control system that has typically managed launch 
authority quite closely.  Road mobile systems, to say nothing of submarines far from any 
checking authority, render previous systems insufficient.33
$ *$ *$ *
These qualitative changes, as well as the more modest (at least to date) quantitative in-
creases have potential implications for Chinese strategy and operational practices with re-
gard to nuclear weapons.  China has long proclaimed adherence to a “no-first use” policy, 
and continues to do so today.34  Pursuant to this, it has maintained a relatively relaxed nu-
clear posture: low alert status, warheads deployed separately from delivery systems, and sig-
nals that retaliation need not come immediately to credibly deter.35  While it is clear that 
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27 On the prevalence of such institutional cultures, see Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Dif-
ferences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
28 Open Source Center, article # CPP20070412710006
29 Open Source Center, article # CPP20091215540002
30
31 Open Source Center, article # CPP20091207702002
32
33 On the traditionally tight C2, see John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain 
War (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006).  Suggesting that diffuse location of forces is proving 
challenging is Open Source Center, article # CPP20070716710025.  Little discussion of the navy exists.
34 See Chinese Defense White Paper, 2008.
35Evan S. Medeiros, "Evolving Nuclear Doctrine," in China's Nuclear Future, ed. Paul J Bolt and Albert S Will-
ner (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). Yao, "Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Mini-
mum Deterrence."
the modernization charted above, as well as the modest quantitative increases, could have 
implications for these strategic and operational choices, it is entirely unclear as to the na-
ture of those changes in practice.
There is very clearly an increased dis-
cussion of controlling, curbing, or con-
taining (ezhi) war that has emerged at 
the highest levels of Chinese political 
guidance.  For instance, the two leaders 
(operational commander and political 
commissar) of the Second Artillery 
wrote in 2008, “the Corps will give full 
play to its strategically important role in 
curbing the threat of war” and “The 
Second Artillery Corps as the important 
strategic force to defend national secu-
rity is mainly to assume the tasks of 
curbing the enemy from using nuclear 
weapons against our country.”36  Other 
examples abound.37
While it is entirely reasonable to expect 
that this political guidance is supported 
by more detailed analysis, it should be 
noted that in the available sources, the 
sophistication of these discussions re-
mains preliminary.  Nothing like Her-
man Kahn’s ladder of escalation has 
been discussed.  One key element for 
moving to a more responsive posture is 
increased strategic warning and en-
hanced command and control assets.  
While one should expect these areas to 
be among the more tightly held secrets, 
it is notable that little discussion of 
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
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36 Open Source Center, article # CPP20060629710010
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Figure 7: Herman Kahn’s Steps on the Ladder 
of Escalation (from On Escalation (1965)
them has appeared in open sources.38Nevertheless, increasing discussion of controlling war 
is apparent at the margins, and to a lesser and more superficial extent, at the core of Chinese 
publications on nuclear strategy.39
China’s own strategic capabilities are increasing in absolute terms.  But that does not equate 
with an increase in Chinese power as capability.  First of all, other countries are not standing 
idle during China’s modernization, and power is inherently relative.  Second, nuclear weap-
ons are a peculiar form of military capability; they are so rarely used that much of their 
power is perceptual.40  The next section then outlines the perceptions of China’s neighbors 
regarding this modernization and the steps that they themselves are taking in response.
Regional Reactions
The four most important security relationships for China today are with the United States, 
Japan, India, and Taiwan.  Each is a player in the strategic arena, either by virtue of its own 
nuclear forces, extended deterrence commitments by the United States, or some strategic 
defensive systems (often a combination of several of these).  Each is also a potential adver-
sary of China’s due to territorial disputes, historic animosity, rivalry over regional hegemony, 
or alignment.  For each of these the domestic debate regarding China’s strategic moderniza-
tion will be briefly characterized, and then the military reaction will be summarized.
J A P A N
In Japan, there is increased awareness of Chinese nuclear capabilities.  In the 2008 Defense 
White Paper, Tokyo spends more time evaluating the nuclear capabilities of the PLA than 
of any other component of China’s military (including the Navy, which one might image 
would pose more of an acute threat).41  The report note looming leaps in Chinese capabili-
ties: “Now that the DF-31 and DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of 
practical use, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great 
margin.”42  These concerns extend to the nascent non-governmental defense community in 
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
! 14
38 Explicitly noting the absence of the former are Open Source Center, article # CPP20090622682003 and 
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39 In addition to the sources cited above, the best are covered in depth by Chase, Erickson and Yeaw, "Chinese 
Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States." Medeiros, 
"Evolving Nuclear Doctrine."
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41 Japanese White Paper, 2008
42 Japanese Defense White Paper, 2008, p. 51
Japan as well.  The annual RIPS survey bemoans the absence of strategic arms control in the 
region,43 and monthly military magazines note the strengthening of Chinese nuclear forces 
at sea and on land.44  Often in these discussions, both governmental and NGO, there is par-
ticular concern regarding the enhancement of capabilities for use against the United 
States.45
Beyond these perceptions, Japan’s reaction to China’s buildup is hard to assess.  Certainly, 
Japan has taken no significant steps towards developing its own nuclear arsenals.  It main-
tains a capable commercial space program and holds a substantial stockpile of fissile mate-
rial, both of which hold some potential for expansion to a weapons program.46 However, 
there is no sign of substantial change in these areas, neither technologically nor in terms of 
political shifts.47 The most recent elections have brought to power a government that is 
questioning fundamentals of the US extended deterrent commitment in decades past.48
On the other hand, Japan’s development and deployment of missile defense systems has 
moved forward rapidly.  Japan has been spending on the order of $1.6b a year (compared to 
U.S. spending, which is running just under $10b).  This figure has increased more than three-
fold in the past 5 years.  Much appears is spent on procurement of radars, Patriot PAC-3, 
and Aegis SM-3 missiles.  Additional funds are directed toward joint development of the fol-
low on generation to the SM-3 missile.  These systems all have great capability against 
China.  Furthermore, future developments seem even more focused on China: a satellite 
based ISR capability would detect Chinese missile launches at great cost.49  Ground based 
radars should be adequate for the North Korean threat.
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Much of the public debate about these programs centers on the North Korean threat.  That 
has certainly mobilized the public, and key points of inflection in the program (a marked 
acceleration after 2006) follow North Korean provocations.  Other turning points pertain to 
domestic politics (Prime Minister Fukuda’s replacement of Abe).50  Nevertheless, China’s 
role looms in the background, always there, always pressuring.  For instance, a National In-
stitute of Defense Studies report (NIDS is an official think tank in Tokyo) explicitly links 
the future of BMD programs to considerations regarding the Chinese forces.51
I N D I A
In India, there is a clear perception of China’s increase nuclear capabilities.  Delhi’s 1998 nu-
clear weapons tests were explicitly linked to Chinese nuclear developments.52  The Times of 
India warns bluntly, “India in China’s Nuke Crosshairs.”53 It also quotes Naval leaders view-
ing the deployment of SSBNs in Hainan Island in the South China Sea as a cause for 
concern.54  Civilian security analysts assess the nuclear deal with the United States quite 
frankly in terms of security competition with China: 
Counterweight Against China: This is a notion the Indian Left parties believe is strongly inherent 
in the nuclear deal. If at all the nuclear deal and strategic partnership mandates such a role, this 
paper opines that India should have no hesitation in emerging as a hedge against China. China is 
undoubtedly India's principal rival in the competition for Asian leadership. Beijing's military mod-
ernization and actions like the ASAT test have created ripples across the globe. Some Asian coun-
tries are exploring avenues to confront China's gigantic growth without affecting their security 
calculus. New Delhi should be open to such thoughts, though not overtly disturbing its equation 
with Beijing.55
A book by Brigadier General Gurmeet Kanwal, one of the innovators in Indian joint doc-
trine at the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi, takes a very pessimistic view of 
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competition with China, highlighting in particular the nuclear aspect of Chinese 
capabilities.56
India is not only talking about China, they are developing a missile optimized to target it.  
Following a very long gestation period, the Agni-III has now entered a period of final test-
ing and may enter service this year.  Two successful tests in 2007 and 2008 followed a failure 
in 2006.57  This missile provides no value against Pakistani targets. Emphasis on its devel-
opment is only explicable with regard to China.58
Beyond this, the U.S.-India deal has been critiqued by many in the United States for permit-
ting the Indians to use its current stockpile of fissile material solely for weapons by provid-
ing it access to the international market for its civilian program.  Only the civilian program 
will be under any safeguards, and even these will be outside of the usual IAEA system.59
Lastly, India is engaged in rapid deployment of a missile defense system. Much of this work 
is indigenous:
India has already demonstrated its ability to track missiles and launch an interceptor fairly accu-
rately, and also the capability to perform onboard data processing to handle ground-based radar 
updates until an autonomous seeker can take over for the homing phase. 
"India has conducted two intercept tests with an interceptor that is basically a Prithvi missile, their 
workhorse. I do not know how scripted the tests were. The target surely was not maneuvering," 
said Ghoshroy [a scientist at MIT following these issues].60
A key component of the US-India nuclear deal inked in 2005 was access for New Delhi to 
classified briefings regarding the Patriot PAC-3 systems. More recent discussions between 
the two have focused on joint development of related technologies.61  Some reports suggest 
that negotiations are progressing towards possible direct sales.62
In sum then, in the Sino-Indian dyad the Chinese are not shifting the balance further in 
their favor.  While modest quantitative increases in Chinese deliverable systems on Indian 
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targets has occurred, a more fundamental shift is the imminent development of a deliverable 
nuclear arsenal on Chinese targets.  Beyond that, given China’s inability to 
T A I W A N
In Taiwan, the primary focus has been on the shorter-range systems and the public debate 
on nuclear or other strategic weapons has been relatively muted.  There is certainly an 
awareness of the naval modernization, including its nuclear components.63  The ASAT test 
was closely watched.64 But by in large the attention centers on conventional forces in the 
public debate.
However, again, there is a procurement side to the story that contains slightly different em-
phasis.  An important element in US-Taiwan military cooperation in recent years has been 
missile defense. Sharing of Patriot missile technology allowed the deployment of an indige-
nous Tien Kung system that incorporated many elements of the US system “off the shelf.”65  
More recently a PAVE PAWS radar was sold in 2007,66 and more advanced Patriot PAC-3 
systems were approved for sale (330 missiles).67  On the naval side, while BMD capable Ar-
leigh Burke destroyers were not approved for sale during the Bush Administration (despite 
heavy lobbying by Taiwan), the Kidd-class destroyers that were eventually sold carry SM-2 
missiles, which might be upgraded to have BMD capabilities.
All of these systems are primarily geared towards China’s massive conventional missile arse-
nal rather than nuclear weapons per se.  The way Taiwan is affected by nuclear dynamics is 
Twomey, Rise of China’s Strategic Forces, draft
! 18
63 Navy Captain Li Shih-ch'in, "Investigation Into Development of PRC's Submarine Force From Perspective 
of Maritime Strategy,” translated as “Taiwan: Study of Development of PRC Submarine Force, Maritime Strat-
egy,” in OSC: CPP20080602312006 Taipei Hai-chun Hsueh-shu Yueh-kan (Internet Version-WWW) in Chi-
nese 22 Apr 08
64 Reserve Air Force Colonel Wang Cheng-hsiung, "Inspirations of the Satellite Shooting Down Incident of 
the PRC for the ROC," translated as “Taiwan Military Study Finds 'Inspiration' in PRC Satellite Shoot Down,” 
OSC: CPP20081112312010 Taipei K'ung-chun Chun-kuan Shuang-yueh-k'an Online in Chinese 01 Oct 07
65 Cite older Janes.
66Shirley Kan, " (Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, September 25, 2008).Tkacik, Taipei Times, 
Saturday, Dec 06, 2008
67Ibid.
primarily through the potential “spillover” of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to the 
region.68  It is to that issue that this chapter now turns.
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
The United States has watched Chinese strategic modernization rather closely over the past 
decade.  The annual report from DOD in 2006 used particularly sharp wording, but the is-
sue has been raised in most of that series of annual reports.69  Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s comments in the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2005 expressed incomprehension at 
China’s buildup (in general) given its secure security environment.  It is commonplace for 
studies to highlight Chinese developments in this area as a means to promote missile de-
fense in domestic debates.70  Official think tanks such as RAND or the Pentagon’s Office of 
Net Assessment are giving the issue more attention.71  Detailed studies based on translated 
documents are published monthly by scholars are the official Center for Chinese Maritime 
Studies at the Naval War College.72
The U.S. has also engaged in some modernization of its own strategic and strategic capable 
forces, although here there are many pressures leading to that.73 American bases in Guam 
have been upgraded and are now home to several new forces. The three new nuclear attack 
submarines based there will be able to triple their time on patrol (for instance, against Chi-
nese SSBNs), in contrast to when they are based in the United States.74 A new wing of B-52 
bombers permanently based in Guam can reach throughout Asia, and an enhanced head-
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quarters unit will facilitate rapid reinforcement in times of crisis—including by B-1 and B-2 
bombers, all nuclear capable.75 Finally, all of the navy’s SM-3 equipped Aegis ships (the 
Navy’s most modern ballistic missile defense system) are deployed to Asia.76 That number 
has recently doubled, from three to six, and is likely to continue to rise.
As far back as the mid-Clinton administration, Washington has been upgrading ties with a 
number of Asian powers on China’s periphery. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. has made its alli-
ances with Japan and South Korea more robust and flexible, shifting their focus from deter-
ring attacks on those two countries to enhancing broader regional stability (albeit grudg-
ingly). In particular, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice very publicly reaffirmed the U.S. 
extended deterrence commitment to Japan in 2005.
Let us turn to investments in the future. Washington has taken forward-looking steps that 
can be construed either as very long-term deterrence or perhaps dissuasion of strategic 
competition. The Pentagon is planning to enhance its conventional strike capabilities in 
ways that seem tailor-made to target China. One of the few new weapons systems called for 
in the 2006 QDR is a long-range penetrating bomber, and research in this area was recently 
reaffirmed in the 2010 version of that document.77 Given that the U.S. can currently conduct 
strike missions against any mid-sized power with existing stealthy B-2s and high-speed B-1s, 
this new platform seems optimized to anticipate Great Power conflict. The specific re-
quirement for a “penetrating” platform suggests a perceived need for strike assets that can 
reach deep interior regions inaccessible to cruise missiles based offshore. As part of its 
Global Strike program, the Pentagon’s Strategic Command is also shifting the way its Ohio-
class ballistic missile launching submarines (SSBNs) are armed. While a dozen or so boats 
will retain their traditional roles as the backbone of the strategic nuclear deterrent, several 
others are being converted to launch long-range conventional cruise missiles (SSGNs). Con-
ventional warheads may be deployed on a few ballistic missiles in each of the remaining 
SSBNs. These systems will have comparative advantage over existing U.S. conventional 
strike platforms only in the case of a conflict posing substantial threats to surface warships 
and carrier aircraft, even those beyond the horizon. The Navy is also aspiring to increase its 
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attack submarine procurement rate. All of these systems seem to be designed to counter 
China at the “strategic” level of conflict. 
On the nuclear side per se, modernization of the U.S. arsenal continues even as the number 
of warheads deployed declines. This upgrading consists of enhancements in both reliability 
and accuracy. Washington’s aggressive promotion of national missile defense programs will 
lead to the deployment of 50 interceptors by 2012. In 2008, the U.S. fielded about as many 
interceptors (24) as China possessed ICMBs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), according 
to current unclassified estimates (and depending on one’s estimate of the number of DF-
31As in operational readiness). Lastly, U.S. satellite systems are being modernized substan-
tially with new programs such as the Space Radar and the SIBRS (Space Based Infrared 
System)-High system.78 As described by Lieber and Press, this package of capabilities calls 
into question the security of traditional second-strike forces in China.79
$ *$ *$ *
Across all these nations then, it is clear there is a perception of the importance of China’s 
activities in this area and some (varying) steps take to counter that rise.  Ideally, a detailed 
analysis of the balance of power in each dyad would be conducted; that is far beyond the 
scope of this study.  However, it is worthwhile to assess the degree to which these changes, 
both by China and her neighbors, have had a significant effect on the conduct of interna-
tional politics in the region.
With regard to the United States, several issues are key.  First, in the 1990s, U.S. capabilities 
to pull off a splendid first strike (that is, to preemptively destroy all of China’s nuclear 
forces) were tenuous, but perhaps imaginable.  However, much uncertainty would have re-
mained.  Current U.S. capabilities would be much more able to destroy 1990s Chinese capa-
bilities.  But that is not the reality, not the force in being in China today.  Instead, current 
U.S. capabilities face the beginnings of a mobile, survivable force.  
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Putting this in terms introduced earlier, it is likely China has shifted from a rudimentarily 
secure second strike in the 90s to a more robustly survivable secure second strike today or in 
the next few years.  This is a shift to be sure, but more one of degree.  Much more impor-
tant will be a Chinese climb to further plateaus such as war fighting. 
Evaluating the Influence
Are Taiwan, Japan, India, or the United States more easily deterrence or compelled by China 
today than they were 10-20 years ago?  This author’s overall conclusion is that China has 
gained remarkably little from its nuclear rise.  Clearly, the problems discussed at the outset 
of this chapter complicate any assessment.  A general deterrent or coercive effect—dissua-
sion if you will—is exceedingly tricky to measure.  The same applies to influence as shaping.  
Furthermore, because of China’s “no first use” policy, overt threats and recourse to nuclear 
bombast are extremely rare.80
On issues of influence as change, there is only limited support for the contention that China 
is achieving outcomes it would desire with these strategic rivals.  On core issues of conten-
tion between Japan and India, no significant progress has been made over the period of the 
past 20 years as the DF-21 force that would threaten these two regional players came online.  
For Japan, the role of US extended deterrence holding robustly over most of that may ex-
plain much, a point to which I shall return.  But no such nuclear umbrella sheltered New 
Delhi.  And yet, territorial disputes with India remain unsettled for both Japan and India.  
For Taiwan, there is arguably a shift toward the mainland’s preferred outcome over the past 
few years, and this is highly likely related to China’s conventional missile buildup.81 It does 
seem quite reasonable to presume that the conventional missile balance has entered into the 
Taiwan population's assessment of the costs of DPP provocations and lead to a moderation.  
However, even here the picture is muddied by other factors.  In short, China’s nuclear rise 
has existed along side her conventional military rise and her economic rise.  
If there has been limited evidence of any increase in Chinese coercive power, might there be 
still a shift in “war winning power” in China’s favor?  Again, the evidence is slim, at least in 
the nuclear arena.  U.S. extended deterrence remains strong.  During the cold war, extensive 
steps were taken to ensure its reliability through the forward stationing of nuclear weapons 
and the deployment of large tripwire forces.  In Japan, neither seems necessary today, and 
mere verbiage seems enough for the time being.
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Taiwan is a different case, of course.  There, the U.S. security commitment is less explicit 
and China’s ability to win a conflict there has—by most outside observer’s assessments—
improved.82
Turning to influence as shaping, in the areas one would expect the most influence, we see little 
effect for China.  We should recall the hypotheses drawn in the introductory chapter: influ-
ence will manifest primarily as shaping prior to the rapid growth of Chinese influence.  
Thus, we should expect to see more Chinese influence as shaping than changing in this con-
temporary period. Given the lack of fungibility of power, we ought see this shaping occur in 
core strategic areas.83 However, as shown repeatedly above, on issues from long range mis-
siles in India and Taiwan, reinvigoration of extended deterrence in Japan, and missile de-
fense in all three, the response of potential rivals has been to compete rather than accept 
the shaping pressures from the rising power.
In Lieu of Conclusions
The overall effect in China’s rise in this area seems muted.  There are likely several reasons 
for this.  First, China’s growth in its own capabilities is not exceptionally fast.  Second, re-
gional responses to that growth reduce the effect on relative capabilities.  Third, Chinas’ rise 
relative to the United States is trivial, and the US has extended deterrent relationship with 
several key players in the region.  Fourth, China’s nuclear rise does increase their relative 
power over neighbors in the absence of that extended deterrent commitment, but that 
situation has maintained since the 1980s.
Likely more important than all these is that nuclear weapons are not a particularly impor-
tant source of power except in extremis.84
The only real change is a solidification of the secure second strike versus the United States.  
However, there was always some degree of security here, at least from the U.S. perspective 
in terms of uncertainty about the viability of a first strike (existential deterrence would have 
held in all but the most dangerous scenarios).  But other players may have been more confi-
dent of the United States, and for them, as the survivability of the Chinese second strike 
becomes more apparent, the credibility of the American extended deterrent threat may 
come under threat.  This should lead to increased interest in ways to enhance that credibil-
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ity, including but well beyond Japan’s desire for restatement of policy. This will inevitably 
depend on the continuing relative pace of growth in the strategic capabilities of China, the 
United States, and other regional players.
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Another important effect in the Sino-American dyad is one of arms race and crisis stability.  
In both areas, there are grounds for concern.  There is an element of a qualitative (if not 
quantitative) arms race ongoing between the United States and China (through offense/
defense weapons competition, if nothing else).  In terms of crisis stability, the lack of strate-
gic warning for China pushes them towards dangerous postures, and the difficulties in relia-
bly controlling our own SSBNs suggest a dangerous period as China’s own deterrent puts to 
sea.  Wartime command and control more generally for China in an intense conventional 
conflict seems problematic as well.
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